Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics (Q2397637): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2339212378 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Theory of Wage Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic moral hazard without commitment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Impatience versus Incentives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Political Economy of Indirect Control * / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal Contracts with Shirking / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 21:28, 13 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
scientific article

    Statements

    Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    23 May 2017
    0 references
    relational contracts
    0 references
    limited liability
    0 references
    efficiency wages
    0 references

    Identifiers