Observability and endogenous organizations (Q2358787): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 00:26, 14 July 2024

scientific article
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Observability and endogenous organizations
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    Observability and endogenous organizations (English)
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    16 June 2017
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    organizational design
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    observability
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    relative performance regime
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    group regime
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    general equilibrium
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    value of information
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