Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The kernel of a cooperative game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Impossibilities for roommate problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5202533 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Consistent extensions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Distributive justice in taxation / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 01:57, 14 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
scientific article

    Statements

    Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    6 July 2017
    0 references
    school choice
    0 references
    immediate acceptance rule
    0 references
    top trading cycles rule
    0 references

    Identifiers