Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat (Q2013504): Difference between revisions

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+.07406
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+CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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+Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
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+Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
@@ Property / cites work: Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift? / rank @@
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+Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
@@ Property / cites work: Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games / rank @@
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+Q3040961
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+Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
@@ Property / cites work: Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma / rank @@
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+Q5486447
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+Automata, repeated games and noise
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+How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
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+The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
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+Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
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+A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
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+Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
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+The Calculus of Selfishness
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+From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
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+Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
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+Cooperation in the short and in the long run
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