Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (Q2406941): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.002 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:34, 14 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
scientific article

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    Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (English)
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    4 October 2017
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    auction market
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    destruction-proof mechanism
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    endowment
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    multiple goods
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    per-capita goods-buyer submodularity
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