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Latest revision as of 15:55, 14 July 2024

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Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
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    Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (English)
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    7 November 2017
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    revenue maximization
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    mechanism design
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    auctions
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    multiple goods
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    bundling
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    separate selling
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    simple mechanisms
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