Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers (Q1680148): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 18:10, 14 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
scientific article

    Statements

    Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers (English)
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    22 November 2017
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    mechanism design
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    strategy-proofness
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    veto
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    probabilistic mechanism
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    committee selection
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    Identifiers