Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences (Q1304442)

Consider a set of \(n\) individuals, \(n\) at least two, choosing over a set \(A\) of alternatives (again, at least two). In particular, suppose that individuals' preferences over \(A\) are continuous and separable, and \(A\) is a product set. Let \(F\) be a social choice function. The main result of the paper is that if \(F\) is nonimposed and strategy-proof, and each component of the product set contains at least 3 alternatives, then \(F\) is component-wise dictatorial. If in addition, \(F\) is Pareto consistent, then a single individual must dictate on all components. These results strikingly generalize both Arrow's theorem (1951) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (1973/1975).