Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma (Q1749007): Difference between revisions

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-https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.025
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-W2753726634
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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.025
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+W2753726634
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+Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors
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+Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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+Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
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+The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
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+The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
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+A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
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