Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain (Q1753138): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:37, 15 July 2024

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Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
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    Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain (English)
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    25 May 2018
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    mechanism design
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    approximation algorithm
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    strategy-proof
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    efficiency
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    Pareto-optimal
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    anonymous
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