Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (Q1668286): Difference between revisions

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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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+Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
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+Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
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+Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
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+Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
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