Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings (Q1672900): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:51, 16 July 2024

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Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
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    Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings (English)
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    11 September 2018
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    implementability
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    Walrasian equilibrium
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    efficient matchings
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    assignment problem
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    mechanism design
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