Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts (Q1782287): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:55, 16 July 2024

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Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
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    Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts (English)
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    20 September 2018
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    executive compensation
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    principal-agent model
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    prudence
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    risk aversion
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