One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations (Q1797596): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Created claim: Wikidata QID (P12): Q41773460, #quickstatements; #temporary_batch_1710328330639
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2147934054 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4439632 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary game dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3040961 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Logic of Animal Conflict / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5486447 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary stability on graphs / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Finite populations choose an optimal language / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4885257 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 00:03, 17 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
scientific article

    Statements

    One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    22 October 2018
    0 references
    fixation probabilities
    0 references
    frequency-dependent Moran process
    0 references
    common interest games
    0 references
    language games
    0 references

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references