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Property / author: Luciano I. de Castro / rank
 
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Revision as of 09:46, 17 July 2024

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Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
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    Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (English)
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    19 November 2018
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    asymmetric information
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    ambiguity aversion
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    incentive compatibility
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    mechanism design
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    first-best
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    second-best
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