Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments (Q1627001): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:38, 17 July 2024

scientific article
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Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
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    Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments (English)
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    22 November 2018
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    incentive compatibility
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    efficiency
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    financial constraints
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    mechanism design
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    impossibility
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