Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments (Q1627001): Difference between revisions

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+Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control
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+Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
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+Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
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+Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
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+Q3208356
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
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+Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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+Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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+A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
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+Beyond Moulin mechanisms
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+Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
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+An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
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+On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
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+A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
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