Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game (Q1630474): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Latest revision as of 15:43, 17 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game |
scientific article |
Statements
Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game (English)
0 references
10 December 2018
0 references
Summary: We elicit `individual-level' peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments \textit{within subject}, we observe a high degree of individuals' punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.
0 references
peer punishment
0 references
strategy method
0 references
type classification
0 references
public goods game
0 references
coordination game
0 references
weakest link game
0 references
0 references
