Optimal self-enforcement and termination (Q1734582): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.12.010 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 23:31, 18 July 2024

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Optimal self-enforcement and termination
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    Optimal self-enforcement and termination (English)
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    27 March 2019
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    optimal contracting
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    outside opportunities
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    self-enforcement
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    termination
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