Manipulability in a group activity selection problem (Q2417416): Difference between revisions

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+Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
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+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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+Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving
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+Stability in coalition formation games
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+Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences
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+Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
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+Manipulation of social choice functions
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
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+Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
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+Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
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+Q3332693
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+Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
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+Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
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+Strategy-proof coalition formation
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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