On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games (Q2201708): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:53, 23 July 2024

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On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
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    On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games (English)
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    17 September 2020
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    sender-receiver games
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    asymmetric information
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    mechanism design with limited commitment
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