Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game (Q2206810): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(3 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.011 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W3043967478 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Joint Projects without Commitment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Projects and Team Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 21:59, 23 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game
scientific article

    Statements

    Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    26 October 2020
    0 references
    dynamic contribution game
    0 references
    contribute once
    0 references
    efficiency
    0 references

    Identifiers