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Latest revision as of 14:36, 24 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7309871
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Principal-Agent Models
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7309871

    Statements

    Principal-Agent Models (English)
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    15 February 2021
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    incentives
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    contracts
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    asymmetric information
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    moral hazard
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    adverse selection
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