Market Design (Q5150291): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_655
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+W4252926882
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+Q3999327
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+Stability with one-sided incomplete information
@@ Property / cites work: Stability with one-sided incomplete information / rank @@
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+College admissions with affirmative action
@@ Property / cites work: College admissions with affirmative action / rank @@
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+Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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+House allocation with existing tenants
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+Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
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+Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange / rank @@
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+Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
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+MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
@@ Property / cites work: MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY / rank @@
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
@@ Property / cites work: A new solution to the random assignment problem. / rank @@
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+On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
@@ Property / cites work: On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences / rank @@
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+Two-sided matching with interdependent values
@@ Property / cites work: Two-sided matching with interdependent values / rank @@
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+Group stability in matching with interdependent values
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+Efficient assignment with interdependent values
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient assignment with interdependent values / rank @@
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+School choice: an experimental study
@@ Property / cites work: School choice: an experimental study / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Effective affirmative action in school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Effective affirmative action in school choice / rank @@
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+The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
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+The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
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+Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
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+Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
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+Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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+Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Kidney Exchange
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Dynamic Kidney Exchange
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+Pairwise kidney exchange
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+Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
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