Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1
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+W2950347886
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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+Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
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