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Latest revision as of 14:38, 25 July 2024

scientific article
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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
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    Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (English)
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    27 April 2021
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    many-to-many
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    acyclicity
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    stability
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    strategy-proofness
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