Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts (Q2049498): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.002 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:10, 26 July 2024

scientific article
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Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
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    Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts (English)
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    25 August 2021
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    many-to-many matching
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    stability
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    observable substitutability
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    size monotonicity
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    cumulative offer algorithm
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