Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences (Q2074044): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:47, 27 July 2024

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Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
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    Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences (English)
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    4 February 2022
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    persuasion
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    efficient
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    individually rational
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    incentive compatibility
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    Wald's maxmin preferences
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