Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems (Q1296478): Difference between revisions

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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
@@ Property / cites work: Nash implementation of matching rules / rank @@
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
@@ Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank @@
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
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+Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
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+The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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+Q127647245
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q127647245 / rank @@
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