Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations (Q2217350): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:22, 29 July 2024

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Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
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    Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations (English)
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    29 December 2020
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    positionalist voting rules
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    individual rankings
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    lexicographic extensions
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    plurality rule
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