On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals (Q2152112): Difference between revisions

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+Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
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+Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
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+Strategic Information Transmission
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+Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
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+Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
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+The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
@@ Property / cites work: The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure / rank @@
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+Persuasion with communication costs
@@ Property / cites work: Persuasion with communication costs / rank @@
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+Experimental design to persuade
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+Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
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+Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
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+Persuasion with limited communication capacity
@@ Property / cites work: Persuasion with limited communication capacity / rank @@
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+Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
@@ Property / cites work: Bayesian persuasion with costly messages / rank @@
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