Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game (Q4594583): Difference between revisions

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+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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+Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
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+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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+The evolution of cooperation through imitation
@@ Property / cites work: The evolution of cooperation through imitation / rank @@
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+Q3083744
@@ Property / cites work: Q3083744 / rank @@
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+External conversions of player strategy in an evolutionary game: A cost-benefit analysis through optimal control
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+Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1017/s0956792515000649
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+W2128234973
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2128234973 / rank @@
+Normal rank