Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis (Q4978196): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
Set OpenAlex properties.
 
(4 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / author
 
Property / author: N. V. Gravin / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / author
 
Property / author: N. V. Gravin / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Knapsack auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4633940 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q2934624 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimization with demand oracles / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Budget feasible mechanism design / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5365076 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5365074 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4708452 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5365073 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Revenue maximization with a single sample / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Selling privacy at auction / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competitive auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incentives in Teams / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3549687 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Algorithmic Game Theory / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On optimal single-item auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/16m1067275 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2746065370 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 09:01, 30 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6762061
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6762061

    Statements

    Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    18 August 2017
    0 references
    mechanism design
    0 references
    budget feasible
    0 references
    prior-free
    0 references
    Bayesian
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers