Efficient performance in two agent bargaining (Q1092778): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: Bargaining under Incomplete Information / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading / rank | |||
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90010-x / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 10:08, 30 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Efficient performance in two agent bargaining |
scientific article |
Statements
Efficient performance in two agent bargaining (English)
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1987
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An allocation rule in a bargaining problem is given by two functions from pairs of stated valuations by the two parties, one determining probability of transfer of the item, the other determining a money payment. The author presents a set of conditions which will guarantee that allocation rules in a certain class are both individually rational and efficient.
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auctions
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individual rationality
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efficiency
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An allocation rule
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bargaining
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