The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences (Q1311270): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and ``median voters''
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and ``median voters'' / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90169-d
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W3123876248
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W3123876248 / rank @@
+Normal rank