Pricing and investments in matching markets (Q4585983): Difference between revisions

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+Q3794956
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+Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
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+Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
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+Q4039882
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
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+Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
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+The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
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+On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
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+Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium
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+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
@@ Property / cites work: Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets / rank @@
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+Strategic Information Revelation
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic Information Revelation / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search
@@ Property / cites work: Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5297301
@@ Property / cites work: Q5297301 / rank @@
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+Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
@@ Property / cites work: Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.3982/te1189
@@ Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1189 / rank @@
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+W3123086201
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W3123086201 / rank @@
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