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Latest revision as of 10:14, 30 July 2024

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A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
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    A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions (English)
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    1979
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    Social Choice
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    Nash-Stability
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    Group Decision Functions
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    Individual Preferences
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