Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth (Q1093626): Difference between revisions

In \textit{S. Kripke}'s theory of truth [J. Philos. 72, 690-716 (1975)], the statement that A is true need not be true or false; hence `true' in that theory is a partial predicate. Reinhardt here argues that Kripke's theory can be regarded as an implementation of a suggestion of \textit{K. Gödel} [in P. A. Schilpp (ed.): The philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Evanston, 1946)] to resolve the semantic paradoxes using the notion of meaningful applicability. The paper contains extensive discussions of other work on the paradoxes, especially \textit{T. Burge} [J. Philos. 76, 169-198 (1979)], but strangely neglects other writing on significance logic and nonsense, e.g., \textit{L. Goddard} and \textit{R. Routley} [The logic of significance and context. Vol. I (1973; Zbl 0302.02004)].