An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games (Q5925964): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 12:04, 30 July 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1574323
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1574323 |
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An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games (English)
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28 January 2004
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The authors determine a closed formulae for calculating the Lebesgue measures of the stability sets of Nash equilibria in pure coordination games. They show by examples that the Lebesgue measure of a stability set may happen to be in conflict with the risk-dominance in the sense that one of these indicators of stability of a Nash equilibrium may happen to be low when the other is high.
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cordination game
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Nash equilibrium in coordination game
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stability set
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