Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments (Q2178016): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:31, 30 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments
scientific article

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    Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments (English)
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    7 May 2020
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    repeated prisoner's dilemma
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    imperfect private monitoring
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    experiments
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    generous tit-for-tat
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    retaliation intensity
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