A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers (Q5049409): Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 19:00, 30 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7615522

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers	scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7615522

Statements

instance of

scholarly article

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title

A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers (English)

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author

Takehiro Inohara

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published in

Translational Systems Sciences

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publication date

11 November 2022

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zbMATH Keywords

group decision and negotiation

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consensus

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committees

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core

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efficiency

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Nash equilibrium

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11

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cites work

Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.

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The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

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Equilibrium points in <i>n</i> -person games

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Non-cooperative games

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Q3677437

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Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

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New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

1504.91076

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DOI

10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:5049409

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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11
+Normal rank
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+W4285284274
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W4285284274 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equilibrium points in             <i>n</i>             -person games
@@ Property / cites work: Equilibrium points in <i>n</i> -person games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-cooperative games
@@ Property / cites work: Non-cooperative games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3677437
@@ Property / cites work: Q3677437 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
+Normal rank