An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation (Q2095939): Difference between revisions

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+Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
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+A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states
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+Q4439632
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+Evolutionary Games in Economics
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+On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games
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+Evolutionary game dynamics
@@ Property / cites work: Evolutionary game dynamics / rank @@
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+Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
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+Q4885257
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+Publication:2095939