Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts (Q6108295): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Measuring the Welfare Gains from Optimal Incentive Regulation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Identification of Standard Auction Models / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nonparametric Estimation of Sample Selection Models / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The provision of wage incentives: A structural estimation using contracts variation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric Appliance Holdings and Consumption / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competitive bidding and proprietary information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A WARP-SPEED METHOD FOR CONDUCTING MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS INVOLVING BOOTSTRAP ESTIMATORS / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q2736598 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Adverse Selection in the Labour Market / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Extremum sieve estimation in <font><i>k</i></font>-out-of-<font><i>n</i></font> systems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3522342 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence From the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q2995585 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 13:58, 1 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7704488
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7704488

    Statements

    Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    29 June 2023
    0 references
    0 references
    econometrics of auctions
    0 references
    econometrics of contracts
    0 references
    endogenous matching
    0 references
    polychotomous sample selection
    0 references
    price-performance elasticity
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references