Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence (Q6077637): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12214
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+W2939061774
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
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+Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
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+Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+Incentives in landing slot problems
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives in landing slot problems / rank @@
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+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:6077637