Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults (Q6087280): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104755 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:46, 3 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7765448
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Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7765448

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