Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli (Q1735746): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:54, 17 August 2024

scientific article
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Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
scientific article

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    Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli (English)
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    29 March 2019
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    evolution of preferences
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    indirect evolutionary approach
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    theory of mind
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    depth of reasoning
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    deception
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    efficiency
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    Identifiers

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