Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework (Q6067191): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-023-00449-z
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+W4360613528
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+An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
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+Groundwater exploitation and illegal behaviors in a differential game
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+Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management
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+Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
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+Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
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+A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states
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+Optimal adaptation strategies to face shocks on groundwater resources
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+The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
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+Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case
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+Publication:6067191