Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences (Q6188684): Difference between revisions

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+Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
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+A bargaining set for roommate problems
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+The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
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+Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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+A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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+TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY
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+Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
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+Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
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+Stability in matching markets with peer effects
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+The roommate problem with externalities
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+School choice with neighbors
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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+THE ASSIGNMENT GAME WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY
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+Matching with aggregate externalities
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+Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
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+Coalition formation problems with externalities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Stability of marriage with externalities
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+Multilateral matching
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+Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
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+Q2921653
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+A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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+The core for housing markets with limited externalities
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+Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
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+Stable husbands
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+Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
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+Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
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+Random stable matchings
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+Stable roommates problem with random preferences
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+Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
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+Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities
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+Some inequalities relating to the partial sum of binomial probabilities
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+The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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+On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
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+The ``stable roommates'' problem with random preferences
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+On random stable partitions
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+Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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+Matching with Externalities
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+Q3999327
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+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
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