Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting (Q996364): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:38, 13 November 2024

scientific article
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Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
scientific article

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    Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting (English)
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    14 September 2007
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    Monitoring
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    common agency
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    costly state verification
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