Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context (Q2268897): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Anthony A. J. Marley / rank
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Property / author: Anthony A. J. Marley / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2104257901 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 01:43, 14 November 2024

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Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
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